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ABSTRACT  
 
Within the narratives of neoliberalism and international law women are often represented 
as victims. It is in times of conflict that women’s roles are generally limited and ignored. 
Law is guilty of creating more protection for women that effectively perpetuates their 
status as victims. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) are two examples where 
neoliberalism is reaffirmed though international law. Feminists and advocates, who 
bolster law’s use, are often unintentionally supporting the link between neoliberalism, 
and international law and human rights. This link at its core uses women to support its 
aims, as neoliberalism needs a victim to aid in its reproduction. Due to this unfortunate 
situation women are rarely seen as perpetrators of crimes. Changing the predominate 
narrative surrounding women in times of conflict can only be seen to aid women, yet very 
few are comfortable with seeing women as violators.  The United States female soldier’s 
actions in Abu Ghraib were one such situation where the international community 
unanimously chose to treat women, who displayed the power of agency, as an aberration. 
Looking at Abu Ghraib as something positive for women, and rethinking the discourse 
that surrounded the ICTY and ICTR gives women the opportunity to be seen as 
something other than the consummate victim. Analyzing the influence of neoliberalism, 
and the use of law in reproducing incorrect representations of women further proves that 
in order for women to be seen as encompassing all forms of human expression one must 
first become resigned to the fact that women are very capable of committing violent 
crimes.   
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I. Introduction  
Women, as a sex, have been constructed to fit into multiple categories and forced to 
inhabit various definitions of the supposed female gender. While many would argue that 
these definitions and categories are dominant representations of women, one could also 
argue that these representations are rather selective. Although it is not hard for people to 
imagine all of the negative images women are associated with, women are rarely 
described as villains. The word villain suggests that there is something evil in one’s 
nature and malicious in one’s intent; this is not normally used to describe a woman, 
because it is assumed, by many that women are by nature, gentle maternal creatures. 
These preconceived notions are so ingrained within human beings that it is rarely 
contradicted. Even ‘feminists’ scarcely refer to women’s ‘lesser’ qualities,1
Women are continually fighting to be seen as fully human, as every person needs 
to be seen as a human capable of goodness and evil. However, something has almost 
purposefully been left out of the focus of those who seek to strengthen the female 
position, which is the realization that women too are capable of committing terrible 
crimes. It is not only men who employ this assumption, but women as well. It is as if the 
awareness of this fact would somehow upset the notions men and women presume about 
the female sex, and then women would no longer be able to push for change. The aim to 
acknowledge women as violators is not done to disenfranchise women but rather the 
opposite. To expand the term ‘women’ to include all aspects of human nature, only 
supports the work of feminists; women are so often perceived in need of special 
protection under the law because in many situations the status of women are exploited as 
a rule.
 in fear that 
this could diminish the gains they have accomplished. It is hard to understand why there 
is such fear amongst people when describing the evils women do. If their argument is for 
a greater understanding and inclusion of women in all aspects of life, is it not equally 
important for women to been seen as naturally flawed, or to be put more precisely, as 
human? 
2
                                                   
1 Karen Engle, Judging Sex in War, 106 MICH. L. R. 941, 953 (2008). 
 Even when laws are expanded, to interpret acts of violence against women in a 
2 Id.  
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broader range, this still serves within the preset ideals of difference between men and 
women. Laws, therefore, favor women but reinforce a male position.  The vulnerability 
category in law has often been a place where advocates have rallied around those groups 
deemed in special need of protection or in a word ‘vulnerable’. Whether their intention is 
to dissolve the category entirely or not, this place of contention strips away personal 
autonomy. This concept also bares certain consequences in its qualification; does the use 
of this category, the special protection of women in law, in and of itself create the reason 
it is perpetuated? The vulnerability category only strengthens these female 
representations. There is a clear structural bias present within law and people often have 
less fear when more law is included, if it is used to protect women, because it solidifies 
women’s status as victims. In conflict situations immediate assumptions dictate that 
women are in need of protection as they suffer greatly during war, and while one would 
never deny this fact, there is something to be said for the work the law does to reinforce 
these ‘standards.’  
It would be to the benefit women and men if the world could become comfortable 
with the idea that women are villains. Women would no longer be placed into specific 
roles, the role of loving mother, doting wife, or helpless victim. Men would likewise no 
longer need to be portrayed as solely violators; this would leave room for men to be seen 
as perpetrators of kindness rather than of evil.3
                                                   
3 Id. at 956. 
  It is a common theme to see men as 
aggressors in war, there is no denying that men often make up the majority of military 
forces, but there is also no denying that men face their own predetermined sets of 
representation. The ideas of the male Casanova or the aggressive hyper masculine male 
are clearly just as limiting and prejudiced as those ‘classic’ female archetypes. Currently 
law and society creates a binary where women are the continual victim and if women are 
the victim then men by default must be the violator. If women are then seen as villains, 
those who violate, then men no longer need to predeterminately fill this role. This allows 
men to be seen as multidimensional as well.  
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International law is equally involved in misrepresenting women or falling silent 
where less common roles of women are seen.4 Women in conflict situations are exposed 
to a type of violence that is often sexual in nature; rape is deployed and is regrettably 
commonplace in volatile situations.5 Keeping women relegated to a specific place in 
conflicts negatively affects not only the women who were brutalized at the hands of other 
women, but the men who were sexually assaulted as well. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) are two such examples of situations where the international community 
unanimously chose to silence the breadth of women’s involvement in war. These two 
Tribunals are a useful starting point in order to scrutinize the way international law views 
women, especially in relation to sexual violence. These Tribunals were responsible for 
expanding the definition of rape and indicting individuals who took part in genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity.6
It is necessary then to understand and recognize the way the law effectively 
victimizes women and in the same turn only allows women to represent maternal, 
innocent, traditional values. These common representations are evident throughout 
international law and global governance.  Law’s silence on the issue of women as 
violators supports the claim that these gender stereotypes do in fact exist; the lack of 
evidence in the law that acknowledges women as villains is enough to prove it as a valid 
statement. The effect that law has is to say that the law seeks to oppress; often a push 
towards more protection for women in times of need, also creates the space to employ 
prescriptive gender roles. Some may say that this is not intentional, while others would 
disagree, law is important because it allows a greater realization of rights and not the 
latter. However, this idea fails to take into account who it is that is responsible for 
creating these laws. It is not only people within the ICTY and ICTR to be sure, it is the 
West, that has become the barer of rights controlling International Courts and policy 
 These actions taken by international law only 
further relegate women to remain forever the victim and little else.   
                                                   
4 Id. at 953. 
5 Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence under International 
Criminal Law, 101 AM. J. INT. L. 121, 121 (2007). 
6 Id. at 128-131. 
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making, and it is even the most well meaning feminists and advocate.7
This work examines the theory of neoliberalism and its affect on the status of 
women, both in law and the way women are stereotyped. Neoliberalism’s relationship to 
human rights and international law is discussed, as well as its use by the West. 
Neoliberalism is also used as a way to critique the ICTY, ICTR, and Abu Ghraib. The 
ICTY and ICTR showcase the international community’s tendency to define women as 
victims and urge to ‘protect’ women in times of severe brutality. The focus is not on the 
actual trials of the tribunals, but how rape came to be defined, and how advocates 
contributed to the courts. The involvement of female U.S. soldiers in the atrocities of Abu 
Ghraib is also discussed, using this situation as an example of how the international 
community reacts to women as violators. This case study is useful in order to display how 
people react when women act outside ‘normal’ female roles as well as to support the 
argument that women who commit crimes are good for women as a whole. By making 
such a statement it would seem as if this paper supports the torture at Abu Ghraib or 
encourages more women to commit crimes. However, this is not the case, although the 
recognition of the fact that women are cable of this type of physical destruction is good. 
Women do and will continue to commit crimes every day. The problem is that they are 
not adequately discussed, and when they are mentioned they are qualified with numerous 
statements about gender, as if women who commit crimes are an aberration. Abu Ghraib 
is used in this paper because seeing women in such positions or roles prompted such a 
strong reaction from many people that called into question women and gender. This is 
good, talking and recognizing women who commit crimes is good, and Abu Ghraib was 
good for women in a particular sense. The questions focused on throughout this research 
are as follows: how does international law enforce this image of women as victims and 
why does it do so? Which would better serve women: more protective law or the ability 
for the world to view women as harmful agents? 
 If any real 
progress can be hoped for then one must not continue to treat women as if they are 
incapable of acting as real human beings full of malice and anger as well as goodness. 
                                                   
7 Engle, supra note 1, at 941. 
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This research shows that international law, in accordance with the tenants of 
neoliberalism, prefers women as victims and actively tries to keep women within this 
confine, which is why it is so impossible to see women as villains. Constructing women 
as victims reinforces that women are inferior and at the same time morally superior. This 
paper begins by defining the current neo-liberal moment and situating it within 
international and human rights law. The way rape is defined in international law is 
important to note; therefore, the cases of the ICTY and ICTR and how they influenced 
these definitions need to be explored. ICTY and ICTR did not aid women on the level of 
international law but reinforced their status as ‘lesser’. Looking at how rape, came to be 
thought of as a war crime, crime against humanity, and genocide, is necessary to gather a 
clear picture of how women are seen in international law, in order to then critique the 
cases of women as violators. The debates between feminists and the results of their work 
will be described as well. The cases of Biljana Plavšić and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko offer 
an interesting insight, as they are the only two women that have been indicted by the 
ICTY and ICTR respectfully.8
Grappling with the idea that advocating for a more inclusive meaning of rape 
relegates women to existing gender roles, a new discourse emerges. When discussing the 
inclusive meaning of rape and sexual violence this paper shows how even with the 
advancement of the definition of rape there have been some consequences that have 
almost furthered women’s suffering in the long term. Using the ICTY and the ICTR, 
reinforces earlier arguments by showing that more inclusion in law does not equal a 
better place for women. Seeing women as violators and villains, on the other hand, 
creates a new and undefined space where women would have to be seen as fully human, 
something the international community is not capable of comprehending.  
 Only convicting two women in the Tribunals sends a 
message of these women are extreme cases, cautionary, and outside the norm. Discussing 
these women shows the gap in law and points to larger gender issues.  
                                                   
8 Engle, supra note 1, at 941. 
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The focus is not only on women as violators but, how the surrounding 
environment of the ICTY and ICTR did not allow women to be seen as perpetrators9 of 
crimes. While the tribunals have only indicted two women, domestic courts like in 
Rwanda have brought many more women to trial.10 This reality is not dismissed but, the 
focus will remain on the work of the ICTY and ICTR. There is an element of the 
international system that warrants special attention. When describing U.S. female soldiers 
roles in Abu Ghraib, in which women were effective perpetrators of horrific violence, it 
is important to realize that these acts can be used to change our mindsets from 
prescriptive gender roles. The debates surrounding the release of the photos from Abu 
Ghraib are centered on specifically the female soldiers implicated, Lynndie England, 
Sabrina Harman, Megan Ambul, and their seeming impossible enjoyment when taking 
part in the atrocities depicted in the photographs.11
The aim is to engage in a discussion in order to demonstrate that it is within 
women’s quest towards whatever issues they deem important, that one cannot operate in 
a vacuum. Women are, as men, capable of horrible things, yet in order to advance 
women’s situation this fact cannot be denied and while one needs to recognize this, it is 
also necessary to see how neoliberalism’s influence on law and feminists takes an active 
role in this process. The goal then is to create a new discourse by which women, the 
ICTY, ICTR, and Abu Ghraib could have been viewed, which would have created better 
‘protection’ of women. This critique can be useful for rethinking one’s position on 
women, international law, and conflict.  
 The debates by no means defend the 
soldier’s actions, they do however, shift through what are many preconceived notions 
about how a woman is expected to behave.  
 
 
                                                   
9 For the purpose of this paper the terms violator, villain, and perpetrator are interchangeable. These terms 
refer to a violation, but not in the sense of unintended actions; rather all three terms include the notion of 
direct intent. Committing a crime, and intending to do so.  
10 Nicole Hogg, “I never poured blood”: Women accused of genocide in Rwanda 58 (Nov. 2001) 
(unpublished L.L.M. thesis, McGill University) (on file with McGill University).   
11 The images that shamed America. (May 2003), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/gall/0,8542,121. [hereinafter Images] 
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II. International Law within the Current Neo-liberal Moment 
It is impossible to properly situate international law’s impact on the current moment 
without acknowledging its distinct connection to the human rights project.  Despite the 
criticisms behind the creation of the international human rights framework, arguments 
that such a framework is inevitably Western and a result of a sort of ‘victor’s justice’12, is 
not the point when one seeks to discuss human rights law within the current climate. The 
point is to move forward from the creation of human rights, on an international stage, to 
the search for what it is human rights have become today. While it would be apt to argue 
that parts of its creation can be seen as problematic, this is not the argument in this case. 
Instead one must acknowledge the fact that human rights law exists and has been the 
predominate force in international law since the end of World War II and now look at 
what human rights and international law has done since, the problems it has caused, the 
people it has disenfranchised, and the categories it is perpetuating.13
The two terms, human rights and international law, can be used synonymously; as 
recent discourse has treated human rights as the galvanizing force behind the push to end 
terrorism and the reasoning behind preemptive wars.
  
14 It is within this moment that 
human rights law has become critical to one’s understanding of the neo-liberal time. 
Costas Douzinas in his book Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism, states that since 1989 human rights has been the official ideology of 
the world. Douzinas further writes that, “All recent wars and occupations have been 
carried out wholly or partly in the name of human rights, democracy, and freedom. 
Human rights become part of a political philosophy and sociology”.15
In 1989 human rights moved from a weapon, to ensure that states seek anti-
communist and pro-Western policies, to the “lingua franca” of the new world order.
  
16
                                                   
12 See Victor Peskin, Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 4 J. HUM. RTS. 213, 214 (2005).  
 In 
other words human rights were finally naturalized, and it is once something becomes 
13 See id.  
14 COSTAS DOUZINAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EMPIRE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF COSMOPOLITANISM 3 
(Routledge-Cavendish) (2007). 
15 Id. at 12. 
16 Id.at 32. 
8 
 
naturalized that one can no longer question it or try to move beyond it. The naturalization 
of human rights states that this is the new way of doing business and everyone must 
follow suit. Douzinas states that it is because of inclusiveness of human rights that they 
are easily accepted by every geographical location, political stances, or religion, which 
makes them the dominate force.17 Despite humble beginnings, as a defense against the 
crude manipulative powers at be, human rights have now become the very weapons of 
those powers because they understand that a policy based in a language of human rights 
is much more effective. It is now, as Douzinas writes, that human rights greatest triumph 
has been achieved, the imposition of the ideology of the rich on the poor.18
  Human rights are a tool in the marketplace and are so interwoven within the 
West that they are exploited. Douzinas gives an example of the way the West exploits 
democracy and good governance by describing the United States’ reaction to policies that 
were said to have challenged ‘American hegemony’. He explained how an American 
official complained that President Hugo Chavez was creating regional instability through 
redistributing oil wealth; despite the fact the president was democratically elected, 
Chavez was still harming democratic institutions.
  
19 This reaction is not based on the fact 
that the United States is particularly worried about the stability of democratic institutions; 
what is more apparent is the fact that the United States is concerned with any action that 
would negatively affect American hegemonic ideals. The West, seen as the leader in their 
‘respect for all human life’ is continually seen as the standard by which the rest of the 
world needs to follow, where human rights as well as the economy are concerned. It 
should not be surprising that the West is the forefront for economic policy and human 
rights; these two areas are decidedly interwoven, as human rights are used to bolster the 
economic capitalist agenda. Human rights are no longer a way of critically engaging in 
global/ local disputes or conflicts, they have become the standard way of doing business 
and are now a way to smooth over international relations and gain friends.20
                                                   
17 See Id. at 7. 
 Since the 
West posses all of the human rights, they are capable of bestowing these rights upon the 
18 See Id.st 43. 
19 Id at 85. 
20 Id. at 32. 
9 
 
rest of the world. The West has framed human rights in such a way that those who are not 
on the side of the West, those who do not believe in the importance of capitalism or the 
particular Western brand of democracy, are seen as the enemy; this idea is reminiscent of 
George Bush Jr.’s thoughts in 2002 on preemptive action.21
Rights can offer protection against power, but they can also harm life and regulate 
the body, elements states can use to wield power spreading Western policy. Due to the 
use of human rights in this current moment multiple United States presidents have used 
the language of human rights in order to justify military actions and it is from this 
perspective that Douzinas discusses the ways in which human rights have been replaced 
as the world’s foremost concern, as the threats to state security have increased.
  
22 
Douzinas noted that now is a time when torture and secret camps have become more 
important than humanitarianism, and the states with power believe that states with less 
power can rule themselves, just so long as it does not infringe on the powerful nation’s 
right to rule the entire world.23  When wars or conflict have resulted in a nation, 
theoretically due to a Western peace keeping or preemptive decision, the blueprint is 
clear, stabilize security and then allow NGOs and other institutions to enter the ‘new’ 
nation in order to teach others how to run their country properly.24
Just as human rights have become a tool of regulation and the means to a 
governments desired end, they have also become extremely relevant to international 
criminal law. The rise in criminal adjudication is another indicator of international 
criminal law’s use in the neoliberal project. Both the ICTY and the ICTR are examples of 
such instances when the international community selectively chose to impose 
international criminal law. Ivan Simonovic notes that the establishment of these two 
courts display decisions the community has made which indicate that there are certain 
times in which they are “capable of and willing to impose implementation”.
   
25
                                                   
21 Id. at 3, 32. 
 This 
statement refers to the fact that the international community holds certain situations in 
22 Id. at 6. 
23 See id. at 4, 7. 
24 Id. at 141-142. 
25 Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of International Criminals Adjudication, 23 
FORDHAM INTL. L. J. 440, 446 (1999). 
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higher value, or rather views certain situations desperately in need of their intervention. 
Intervention not solely based on human need, but instead on the ability to manipulate the 
situation for personal gain. Despite the rise in adjudication, starting with the ICTY, 
crimes neither stopped nor were prevented in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This leads one to 
understand the rise in adjudication in criminal law is linked with the rise of human rights 
as a tool to promote neoliberalism. As Kenneth Anderson writes, “international criminal 
law will always exist in tension with UN collective security, the Security Council, and the 
interests and ideals of the Security Council's permanent members.”26
Thus, Tribunals that are established after such conflicts can be seen to be a part of 
that very system of human rights within the neoliberal moment. Tribunals can dispense 
justice, according to the ideals of the West, upon both the aggressor and victors. 
Understanding that there are ‘victims’ on all sides of a conflict, to punish as well as heal, 
is distributed according to Western standards. Feminists and advocates who interact with 
the courts, even if seemingly on behalf of those women who were affected by the conflict 
do so according to their standards of justice. Those whom advocates deem as victims are 
important, as neoliberalism needs victims. The production of victims and enforcement of 
justice by the Tribunals only aids Empire. If neoliberalism on a global scale does not 
have a victim then in what name can wars be waged? If there is no victim then how can 
one dispense ‘proper’ justice after a conflict? These actions, more importantly, allow 
Empire to influence the rest of the world and reshape it in the likeness of the West.   
 International 
criminal law has been idealized as a way to right injustices and to punish those who 
violate human rights; yet, how can criminal law’s successes not be suspect, seeing as it 
seeks to punish those who violate the very human rights  that are used to protect state 
interests? The entire system can be seen as complacent to the tenants of neoliberalism.    
Michel Agier in his article, Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A 
Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government), states that the humanitarian project is 
the “left hand” of Empire, healing the wounds of conflict and death.27
                                                   
26 Kenneth Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 
EUR J INTL L 331, 334 (2009). 
 The problem is that 
27 Michel Agier, Humanity as an identity and its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian 
Government), 1 U PENN PRESS 29, 29-34 (2010). 
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the very powers behind such military interventions are the same powers that swoop in 
afterwards to heal the scars they created. Agier states that the ideas of compassion and 
care seem to be the core of the humanitarian mission but in reality are a process of 
“containment” meant to keep those from areas of recent conflict within their borders.28 
Interestingly enough many United States (US) principles or ‘battle cries’ have been 
turned into universal causes every man, women, and child on this earth can understand 
and belong.29 Claims that state American principles are the principles of every modern 
state and enlightened person make it impossible for people to oppose. Stating that the US 
is in some way important to all of humanity situates the US as the liberator and conceals 
its actions and underlying elitism. By the US engaging in war under the guise of 
humanity it forces states to ‘get on board’ and become modern like ‘us’. Afghanistan and 
Iraq were justified as a liberation, defending people from dictators and spreading 
democracy and freedom. The goal is correction, to correct others so that their 
governments can better, not serve their people, but rather serve those in power. All of 
these actions and ideals are shrouded in human rights.30
This connection between neoliberalism and the victimization of women in 
international law is paramount to the importance of Empire. Human rights are seen as 
liberating women; yet, David Kennedy states that human rights have also had negative 
consequences on women,  
 
“If the human rights movement increases the incidence of descriptions of women 
as mothers-on-pedestals or victimized care givers, in legal decisions or 
institutional documents, that, for some people, is already a cost--ethically, 
aesthetically, politically. It is bad if women have been represented in too narrow 
or stereotypical a fashion, even if the only consequence is to pry loose some 
resources for redistribution to women.”31
 
 
Even when Tribunals are established to dispense justice this always serves within present 
ideals of women as victim. Situating the Tribunals much like the US, with its focus on 
universality states that the process of international law and its components are important 
                                                   
28 Id. at 30. 
29 DOUZINAS, supra  note 14, at 141 
30 Id. 
31 David Kennedy, Boundaries in the Field of Human Rights: The International Human Rights Movement: 
Part of the Problem? 15 HARV. HUM. RTS.  J. 99, 105 (2002).  
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to all of humanity. Taking a position against the work of international law, as this paper 
purports, puts one on the defense automatically, having to defend oneself against what is 
supposed to be the goal of justice and human rights. The Tribunal is seen as the normal, 
right way of dispensing justice and dealing with the aftermath of conflicts; therefore, any 
suggestion to the contrary is seen as tantamount to celebrating the violence and 
destruction realized during the conflict. Since neoliberalism has positioned law as a part 
of the ‘good’ when one calls for less law or a reevaluation of law is seen as a direct 
affront to the production of Empire. Human rights and international law are in this way 
uniquely woven, as they rely on each other for their survival. Human rights produce 
victims and international law manages them; human rights are the main focus of 
international law.32
 Douzinas stated, “Human rights do not belong to humans and do not follow the 
dictates of humanity; they construct humans”.
    
33
                                                   
32 DOUZINAS, supra  note 14, at 177. 
 It is evident that human rights have been 
absorbed into neo-liberal governance and the category of difference has likewise been 
absorbed by human rights and neoliberal project, difference meaning those who do not 
fall into the category of the dominant. Gender has long since been a category of 
difference, and in this category oppression and exploitation have been its main tenants. 
The gender of women is exploited to justify military intervention. In a human rights 
based framework, difference is cited as natural or inevitable and of an insignificant value 
because in reality everyone is the same and difference is superficial. Difference is 
replaced by new constructs of the individual victim. This idea that naturalizes all 
difference much like the human rights framework limits political action and critical 
engagement due to its use of the victim narrative. By neoliberalism identifying itself as 
the producer of equality and the eradicator of difference it reinforces the importance of 
universalism. Human rights now give everyone the same formal protection. This means 
that the new world order will gladly accept difference, this way the dominant cultures 
does not need to blatantly enforce hierarchies of power, assuming those who have been 
33 Id. at 45. 
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incorporated, those outside the dominant culture or the ‘difference’, do not intend on 
challenging the unspoken hierarchy.34
The individual is produced by law, by human rights. This legal subject, especially 
those from areas of military intervention, can then be seen as a ‘victim’, a subject forced 
to be rescued and managed.
  
35 It is in this international regime where the modern subject 
is conceptualized. This victim is represented without the thought of difference, they are 
all the same. Agier notes, “The humanitarian world is based upon the fiction of humanity 
as an identity and conflates universalism and globalization”.36 This idea of universalism 
in an important element of the neo-liberal moment, as universalism allows the new world 
order to be naturalized. Once the regulatory framework is naturalized then there is no 
other space left that does not already involve the production of the Empire.37 One cannot 
look for a place outside of the new world order; therefore, all interactions must be filtered 
through regulatory bodies. Since this universalism exists there needs to be organizations 
in place to ‘deal’ with these ‘victims’, buildings need to be constructed, finances 
transferred, humans need to be present to man these organizations, the variable push for 
humanitarianism sustains a business as well as perpetuating neo-liberal governance.38
Criminal law has also become another arm of neoliberlism by reinforcing a victim 
narrative. Anderson writes, that international criminal law has emphasized the need for 
individual freedoms and rights; however, when law solely focuses on the individual it 
also disregards other issues, such as sides, groups, and parties to a conflict.
  
39
                                                   
34 Id. at 43. 
 Not only 
does this limit the narrative of conflict, but it inherently makes the individual the center 
of the intervention of law, and in doing so it must establish a victim and violator. 
Criminal law is forced to use the terms of human rights such as victim and violator and 
address only those who fit into these predetermined definitions. Kennedy writes on the 
dangers of the victim/ violator binary, he states that humans are far more complex than 
35 Agier, supra note 27, at 30. 
36 Id. at 32. 
37 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (Harvard University Press, 2001) (2000). 
38 Agier, supra note 27, at 30. 
39 Anderson, supra note 26, at 349. 
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these terms can describe.40 Calling someone a violator ignores their personal background 
the same way calling someone a victim alienates their self-expression.41  In line with the 
problem space around these terms one must also be aware of the fact that neoliberalism’s 
focus on the individual victims distracts attention from other issues such as 
colonization.42 Accepting that these categories exist simplifies the human condition; only 
focusing on the suffering of the victim casts away concern for others who have been 
harmed as well. 43 Despite the insistence of neoliberalism, one needs to view this 
situation as a humanitarian endeavor, one that seeks to redress all sides that are harmed 
by the use of human rights. Kennedy even asserts that advocates are to be weary of 
human rights, as it produces a discourse that is decidedly arrogant and causes one to 
speak about people, instead of forming solidarity with those they seek to address.44
This contemporary moment needs human rights as well as women. Law in this 
sense is not aiding in dissolving the violence against women, but rather supporting it. 
When women are addressed in law it is as the status of victim; this is produced through 
neoliberalism and confers that women need to be ‘saved’. Creating more rights for 
women does not allow women to be seen as full members of a society, instead it only 
alters the form of the discrimination and in this sense increase the violence.
   
45 If the 
current discourse revolving around women and sexual violence is not actually stopping 
the violence against women, then something is clearly lacking in the debate. Human 
rights are not enough to prevent women from being assaulted, especially since human 
rights are also guilty of victimizing women, which only furthers harms women. It is 
under the cloak of human rights and humanitarian wars fought in the name of liberating 
women that neo-liberal governance is able to sustain itself. Douzinas writes, “Morality in 
the guise of human rights replaces politics in international affairs and neo-liberal 
economics is imposed by international institutions on governments everywhere”.46
                                                   
40 Kennedy, supra note 31, at 111. 
 The 
41 Id.  
42 See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE 
GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (Princeton University Press) (2002). 
43 Kennedy, supra note 31, at 112. 
44 Id.  
45 DOUZINAS, supra  note 14, at 97. 
46Id. at 191. 
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absorption of human rights and gender allow a remapping of this current moment and aid 
in its growth. These categories are critical to the maintenance of the machines within 
Empire.  
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III. The Inclusive Meaning of Rape and Sexual Violence 
It is cited by many that rape and sexual violence occur every day, yet it seems that in war 
and conflicts rape and sexual violence hold the most attention in the law and amongst the 
public. Many feminists make it their life’s work advocating for a more inclusive meaning 
of rape and sexual violence crimes on an international scale. The assumption seems to be 
that if only the laws and the courts were better defined or prepared to handle those 
horrific situations that happen during war maybe women would suffer less. In order to 
discuss the way law victimizes women during conflict it is important to look at the two 
tribunals that have greatly influenced the jurisprudence around sexual violence, namely 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, (ICTR). Debates surrounding the ICTY 
seem to suggest, if only rape would be defined properly, linked to genocide or not, then 
there could be real change. In the ICTR many blamed the prosecutors, investigators, and 
structure of the court for not reaching its potential when handling sexual violence; if only 
the court was better then, women could find justice. 
The problem with these assumptions is that they do not really seem valid. 
Feminists for years have tried to define rape in international law, even though some 
would disagree with the way rape was defined, most were thrilled with this result of the 
ICTR. However, then the question remains, what now? If this was what we were striving 
for and we finally achieved it, then things should be a lot better for women all around the 
world, but they are not. It is evident that those who push for change need to examine who 
it is they are pushing for. Is it for the betterment of those who experiences sexual 
violence or is it for the betterment of the advocates? This is not to deny that some 
advocates have a personal stake in law regarding sexual violence, as they themselves 
have been affected by violent situations. However, this also falls into the common 
situation of first world women defining and deciding what is appropriate for women of 
the developing world.47
                                                   
47 SITES OF VIOLENCE GENDER AND CONFLICT ZONES, (Wenona Giles and Jennifer Hyndman,  
  Often times the push for more law is to thwart criminals from 
committing crimes in the future as well as aiding women who have been negatively 
University of California Press) (2004).  
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impacted by such actions. One will see later in the paper that despite the fact that more 
laws have been produced and definitions accepted, women seem to be continually 
victimized. It is clear that something is not working.  
Not only is there a problem when women speak on other women’s behalf, 
advocates who often differ from their “subject” in culture, religion, or ideals, but there 
are also issues when women deem themselves fit to handle all of women’s “problems”. 
Yes, violence is upsetting and produces a strong reaction even in those not physically 
affected by it, but does this mean that one who is not technically involved in the situation 
is allowed to decide what is the appropriate reaction concerning law? Clearly there are 
disagreements even amongst those who are within the conflict area, but the push for more 
law or the defining of rape as a war crime, for example, often does not affect those in 
such local areas. Often times women who are harmed by sexual violence have little to do 
with Tribunals such as the ICTY or ICTR and are unaware of the debates surrounding the 
trials.48 Due to the detached nature between the advocates and those on the ground it is 
easy to see that these women are viewed as the consummate victim. As noted above, 
advocates who frame their struggle through human rights are almost unwillingly promote,  
“emancipation by propagating an unbearably normative, earnest, and ultimately arrogant 
mode of thinking and speaking about what is good for people, abstract people, here and 
there, now and forever.”49 This hurts advocates who have a different way of thinking, as 
what is possible and accepted by the human rights discourse is entirely uniform.50
The international is far too removed from the local and it is within these cases that 
one can see a large disconnect between advocates and those locally dealing with a 
conflict’s aftermath. The thought then is not hard to imagine, that feminists are often 
pursuing certain agendas in law in order to satisfy their own personal desires. It is not 
possible to equate this behavior with merely the idea that these feminists and advocates 
  
                                                   
48 GERHARD ANDERS, GLOBAL ORDER IN THE MAKING: THE LOCAL PRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW, 
http://www.google.com.eg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CCwQ
FjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mecon.nomadit.co.uk%2Fpub%2Fconference_epaper_download.php5%
3FPaperID%3D1642&ei=CCVoUZn0JoKJhQfx7IGwBA&usg=AFQjCNEguVjjh_ULyMIvq6tzjGFlTZEPPQ&bvm=
bv.45175338,d.ZG4. 
49 Kennedy, supra note 31, at 112. 
50 Id. at 112. 
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believe they know what is best. Despite the fact that women who are directly affected by 
conflict violence are not always present to discuss many advocates desire for more law, 
this should not indicate that the results of these advocate’s work do not affect those 
women on the ground. If the work of feminists and NGOs did not influence law for those 
affected by conflicts or the stereotypes surrounding women that law perpetuates, then 
there would be no reason to critique their work, as it would bear no real consequences. 
However, because the work done by advocates surrounding these Tribunals affect the 
definitions of sexual crimes, as well as limit women’s perceived roles in war, it is 
important to further scrutinize this disconnect.  There appears to be evidence that where 
crimes of sexual violence are concerned the standard viewpoint is that law needs to 
protect. Law is seemingly present to redress inadequacies; therefore, when violence 
occurs it is only right to seek to punish. 
 However, where sexual violence is present there is a larger body of work 
looming overhead. The severe gender restrictions in society are only that much more 
pronounced and even exploited when sexual violence occurs. Thus, “correcting” or 
“punishing” those who perpetrate sexual violence is not merely a situation of stopping 
such violent episodes, but on a deeper level understanding what motivated the act in the 
first place. The same can be said about murder in general, that assailants possess a deeper 
psychological dilemma, but in this case ‘gender crimes’ bear the weight not only of 
developing the problems in the mindsets of perpetrators, but with those well meaning 
advocates who push for their own agendas. These deeper issues such as women as 
perpetrators are amongst others, dilemmas that need to be fully recognized before such 
decisions in law can be made. At present one is not able to fully advocate for change, 
despite the fact that what change is necessary is not agreed upon or will never be, one 
cannot merely ignore the possibilities that with changing the law comes more oppression 
and elevates these crimes to the level of being more desirable. One cannot also deny that 
women often perpetrate crimes, and in doing so create a situation that law cannot handle.  
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A. The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia was seen by many as a chance to 
increase awareness of feminist ideals and to bring the struggles of women throughout the 
war to light. While some still see the ICTY as a champion for women’s rights others feel 
that they cannot escape consequences of the way the court as well as feminists, handled 
themselves during the events surrounding the trials, further exemplifying that the 
“advancements” feminists gained by furthering normative law around sexual violence, in 
the end, limited the female narrative. Janet Halley, in the article, From the International 
to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/ Sex Work, and Sex 
Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, discusses the 
influence women made within the ICTY. Halley cites Kelly Askin who noted that the 
female judges, investigators, prosecutors, and translators, were very useful in prosecuting 
gender crimes and that NGOs often increased political will to ensure gender crimes were 
investigated and tried.51 In concentrating on adequate prosecuting of sexual violence 
NGOs had to write briefs, hold seminars, do press work, and request meetings, as a large 
amount of lobbying was required to keep sexual violence in the spotlight, so to speak. 
After all their hard work, feminists, especially feminists within NGOs, credited 
themselves with the development of normative law.52
Halley explains that while the work feminists did within the ICTY was considered 
beneficial, the results were not always exactly what were hoped for. In Kunarac, the 
ICTY convicted two Serbian army officers, Dragoljub Kunarac and Radomir Kovač, for 
enslavement, a crime against humanity, as they were seen as organizing and maintaining 
“rape camps” in the town of Foča.
  
53
                                                   
51 Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir, & Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local 
in Feminist Legal Response to Rape, Prostitution/ Sex Work and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism,  29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335, 342 (2007). 
  Many feminists wanted these men to be convicted 
of sexual slavery; however, the term sexual slavery was never used in the judgments, 
enslavement alone was. Yet, feminists felt that because the purpose behind these 
women’s enslavement was for sexual exploitation that sexual slavery would have been a 
52 Id. 
53 Crimes of Sexual Violence, available at http://www.icty.org/sid/10312. 
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more suitable term.54 At the time nowhere in the statue or any other source did it list 
“sexual slavery” as a crime. The difference, feminists stated, between the two terms was 
that enslavement, while present did not encapsulate the entire crime as there was a 
difference in the facts of the case where enslavement and rape were concerned.55 They 
insisted that a primary reason behind the enslavement was to contain the women and girls 
for ‘sexual access’ which would be better termed as sexual slavery and not just 
enslavement alone.56 Enslavement referred to merely the capturing and detaining of, in 
this case, women while sexual slavery referred to detaining with the purpose of sexual 
exploitation.57
This debate clearly shows the importance feminists gave to the assigning of terms. 
“Sexual slavery” is an extremely vivid image; this makes one wonder that if it is 
feminists and advocate’s goal to expose women in this manner. While some women who 
have been involved in sexual violence may feel comfortable having their experiences 
described in this way, it is not possible to think that all women would find these terms 
suitable. It is as if those who advocate for such terms to be included are encouraging the 
world to view ‘victims’ of sexual violence in a very graphic way. To expose these violent 
acts with such terms is to expose those involved as well. 
  
Karen Engle in her article, Feminism and its (Dis)content: Criminalizing Wartime 
Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, describes the divide between feminists on the issue of 
genocide. There were those feminists who advocated for rape to be understood as an 
instrument of genocide in order to separate them from what is considered “everyday 
rape,” these feminists believed that rape was used as a tool for the systematic 
extermination of Bosnian Muslims.58 Catherine MacKinnon was one such feminist, who 
vehemently advocated that the rape by the Serbs should be considered genocide.59
                                                   
54 Halley, supra note 51, at 344. 
 She 
stated that “everyday rape” and even everyday wartime rape were still unlike the rapes 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 It is important to note that in this case slavery and enslavement are of the same meaning, the difference is 
present when using the term “sexual slavery”. It is to say “sexual slavery” differs in their definition from 
merely enslavement.  
58 Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
99 AM. J. INT. LAW. 778, 785-786 (2005).  
59 Id. 
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committed against Bosnian Muslims. MacKinnon also said that difference between 
everyday rape and rape in the legal definition was a product of male dominance, and 
therefore suspect.60 As Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention in a sense protects 
women from sexual violence because they implicate a women’s honor and are seen as 
property, the Convention does not imply that the protection of women is necessary 
because these acts constitute violence.61
Many of the advocates for ‘rape as genocide’, like MacKinnon, believed that 
rapes by Serbian men of Croatian and Bosnian Muslim women constituted genocide, but 
later as Croatia became an more of an aggressor in the war these same advocates shifted 
their definition of ‘rape as genocide’ to only the rape of Bosnian Muslims. MacKinnon 
then favored a definition that distinguished between everyday wartime rape and the 
wartime rape committed by the Serbs
 This is precisely what MacKinnon was 
describing when she stated the legal definition of rape is a product of male dominance.  
62
                                                   
60 Id. 
.  MacKinnon’s switch in definition not only 
points to the arbitrary nature of assigning meaning to terms in the first place, but also 
reveals MacKinnon’s clear black and white thinking. In one were to follow this line of 
thinking then there can be no gray areas, at no point could someone who was not raped 
by the Serbs be considered a part of their definition of genocide. Especially in conflict 
and especially when pushing for better feminist practices one’s thinking must be in line 
with the idea that meanings shift and definitions should not be set in stone. The use of 
definitions in this case clearly victimizes one group and casts another out of one’s line of 
sight. The switching of meaning on the topic of genocide demonstrates that some of those 
feminists, who advocate, like MacKinnon, are not all too concerned about the extent of 
their actions. This gives weight to law and delegitimizes other forms of interpretation. It 
proves very disheartening that feminists who have said they are looking out for the best 
interests of women chose to delineate who is considered a part of their definition of 
genocide and who is not. Not being able to understand the larger gray area war creates 
not only harms women, but jeopardizes women’s ability to be viewed as anything but a 
61 Id. at 779. 
62 Id. 
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victim. As others have noted distinguishing in this case between sides harms women’s 
situation, choosing to pick sides ignores the larger issues present.      
MacKinnon also stated that those who did not see the rapes as genocide were as 
she put it, involved in a “cover-up”. MacKinnon believed that those who denied rape as 
genocide were involved in poor feminist practices and did so in order to free the rapist 
and prevent intervention.63
Other feminists insisted that rape in times of war was sadly normal, and genocide 
should not be the focus of attention. Rhonda Copelon in her article, Surfacing Gender: 
Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law, argued that genocidal rape 
is horrific as well as obvious; therefore, associating rape with genocide creates the 
possibility of rape becoming invisible. She further notes, “Women are targets not simply 
because they 'belong to' the enemy .... They are targets because they too are the enemy; 
.... because rape embodies male domination and female subordination”.
  Since some of the advocates switched their definition of 
“rape as genocide” from including Croatian and Bosnian Muslims to just Bosnian 
Muslims it implies that their concern only lies with those who they consider to be ‘true’ 
victims. Once Croatia became an aggressor their focus switched; it was irrelevant 
whether the occurrence of rape diminished against Croatian Muslims. Their focus 
remained only with those they felt where truly affected by ‘rape as genocide’.   
64  Copelon, goes 
on to say that, with this rhetoric, once again Balkan women were assumed to be victims 
of rape in war.65 Séverine Autesserre in her work on the Congo also noted that focusing 
on the rape of women overshadows other issues, such as the sexual violence against men 
and boys as well as other equally horrific forms of violence.66
Engle address these two ‘camps’ by stating that despite their difference in opinion 
over the issue of genocide both sides carried large assumptions, especially about the 
ethnic differences between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims.
  
67
                                                   
63 Id.at 794. 
 Feminists assumed all 
women were powerless, victims, and incapable of defending themselves, taking sides, 
64 Rhonda Copelon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes against Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 243, 262 1994. 
65 See id. at 264.  
66 Séverine Autesserre, Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended 
Consequences, AFR AFF 1, 15 2012. 
67 Engle, supra note 58, at 794. 
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and participating in war.68 Due to these assumptions the ICTY has treated women as a 
part of the “women and children” concept, and as a result denied sexual and political 
agency.69 Within the effort to define rape as genocide in the ICTY advocates found 
themselves face to face with a difficult issue; if rape was considered commonplace in 
war, or at least in this war, then on whose side should they intervene? Some felt rapes by 
Serbs were genocidal others disagreed. Those who disagreed argued that taking such a 
position would somehow deny the extent to which women were always harmed in war, 
especially in the Balkan conflict. This latter camp believed that rape on all sides should 
be considered genocide, but not because they were perpetrated against a certain ethnic 
group but because they were perpetrated against women as a group.70
Engle goes on to state that those who argue for greater legal protection for women 
against rape often use the argument that rape brings shame on women as well as the 
community.
 This is a 
concerning thought, to prove that genocide is as such because it was perpetrated against 
women, who are then considered to be a protected group, is not only counter to women’s 
interests, but inherently victimizes women as a whole. This thought coincides with the 
narrative that women are the same in all places, in all times. The individual is not just 
stripped of autonomy, but so is the entire population of women as a whole. If an act is to 
be committed against multiple women, then women are presumed victims in their 
entirety. If genocide where to actually be thought of in this way then this would only 
further encourage such violent behavior against women. This definition would elevate 
women to such a protected position, while simultaneously showcasing women as weak 
and frail, unable to be thought of anything but victims of rape/ genocide.  The idea that 
women suffer greatly needs to be reexamined; if the current law victimizes women and is 
doing little to reduce women’s suffering then maybe this approach to law is to blame. 
Maybe even viewing women as a group is harmful, and imposing ideals of victimhood 
and genocide is only making violence that much more attractive.  
71
                                                   
68 Id. at 795. 
 Engle’s argument is that this process of shaming adds power to rape and 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Engle, supra note 1, at 953. 
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because rape is not in every war it is not universal or inevitable, therefore shame is not 
universal or inevitable.72 Engle explains that there are conflicts that do not deploy rape 
and sexual violence as tools of war; therefore rape and sexual violence do not necessarily 
occur whenever there is a conflict. Since sexual violence is not in every situation then, 
why would shame be universal as well? Sexual violence affects every women differently, 
thus one should never assume shame is inevitable.  She further notes that feminists and 
advocates who assume that all raped women are somehow shamed increase the shame 
themselves.73 Western feminists have largely been behind the push to define rape in war 
as an international crime as well as seeking more protection for women. Engle states that 
the ICTY, at the urging of feminists, has limited women’s stories and denied sexual, 
political, and military agency.74
      It is clear that despite the efforts of many to increase laws reach women are still 
confined to very narrow categories in war and conflict. The victimization of women is 
apparent wherever law is engaged. Law becomes the only way for women to interact with 
the state and therefore, one narrative is assumed about all women, in this case all women 
in war. In this current moment law and women’s rights have become the central focus of 
many organizations and government policy. Wars have be waged on behalf of women 
and in doing so have equated women with the need for protection.
 Many feminists in and around the ICTY portrayed all 
women, especially Bosnian Muslim women, as potential victims and denied women’s 
participation in the war militarily and politically. All men, especially Serbian men, were 
seen as potential sexual perpetrators.  
75 As stated by 
Douzinas, it is the obligation of those ‘rational’ beings to lift up such groups, like women, 
to the modern standard.76 Wars waged are not so much to ‘help’ women in as much as 
their idea of helping is to modernize, or raise one to the level of the liberator.77
                                                   
72 Id. at 942. 
  This use 
of women aids the current neo-liberal moment. Women become the producers of Empire 
by the very fact that their existence, it would appear, reinforces the need for law and 
73 Id. at 958. 
74 Id. at 941. 
75 Douzinas, supra note 14, at 12. 
76 Id. at 92. 
77 Id. at 12. 
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protection. Women, a form of difference, are accepted by Empire, but it is because 
Empire needs this difference.78 Empire absorbs all under its guise, yet it is through this 
very absorption that it creates the category of women as victims.79
 Even further divides arose between feminists who were considered “nationalist” 
and “antinationalist”, terms referred to by Jalena Batinic.
  
80 Yugoslav feminists were 
divided; some affiliated only with their national branches while others rejected giving 
priority to national branches or only associating with their national feminist groups, and 
instead were in support of general women solidarity, “antinationalist”.81 Women, who 
had no direct association with the events in the Yugoslav Crisis, where decidedly 
“antinationalist” and clearly distinguished between those who were victims and 
perpetrators. Batinic rejected the ideas of the “antinationalist”, i.e. MacKinnon, citing that 
not only were their claims that genocidal rape was happening to all women wrong, but 
distinguishing between perpetrators and victims was counter to women’s interests.82 This 
is position is concerning since most of the lines between victim and aggressor shifted 
throughout the war. When such categories are present that distinguish between two 
opposing sides, one limits each sides agency and no longer allows alternative views. “The 
Women in Black” movement, a nationalist feminist antiwar movement, went even further 
stating that it is not beneficial to strive to increase the amount of women cited with 
having been raped, as this changes nothing about the singular woman’s suffering. Their 
focus was with each individual and less importance was given to the law and the 
international version of ‘justice’, something MacKinnon and her associates were 
lacking.83
Engle also notes that consensual sex between those on opposite sides of the war 
was impossible and because of the ICTY’s standards regarding evidence of consent, sex 
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between opposing sides was made criminal.84 The idea of consent in international law is 
discussed in Wolfgang Schomburg and Ines Peterson’s article, Genuine Consent to 
Sexual Violence under International Criminal Law, in which they state that consent is 
impossible due to the coercive circumstances that are present when sexual violence 
qualifies as genocide, a crime against humanity, or a war crime.85 Schomburg and 
Peterson further state that consent does not fit in international law and if included in such 
a definition it would ultimately contradict itself.86 The problem that remains with 
Schomburg and Peterson’s idea is that by making consent impossible and only allowing 
consent as an affirmative defense, one almost, as a rule, views all sex in war as 
criminal.87
Engle illustrates that all Bosnian women were believed to have been raped. 
Catherine MacKinnon was one such feminist, who vehemently advocated that the rape by 
Serbs was genocide.
 This does little to further women’s autonomy in war, this takes away their 
decision making power as any act of sex in war is not only criminal, but the very nexus of 
what makes women victims. Not only does this imply that women are inferior, but that 
they are also inferior during all acts of sex in all times. 
88 She said that the difference between everyday rape and rape in the 
legal definition was a product of male dominance, and therefore suspect.89 For 
MacKinnon rape is difficult to define because where sex is concerned male dominance is 
also implicated.90 MacKinnon states that if sex is usually done to women then force 
should not be the issue, rather consent should be more debated upon.91 Seeing as men 
engage in sex and often have no idea that they have violated women, the definition of 
rape should be defined by its meaning from a women’s point of view.92
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 MacKinnon 
favored a definition that distinguished between everyday wartime rape and the wartime 
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rape committed by the Serbs.93   Journalist and feminist activities were frequently 
frustrated as they tried to elicit women’s stories of sexual violence.94 This frustration, 
alongside the fact that many interpreted women’s silence on the issue of rape as 
acknowledgement, made it impossible to view Bosnian Muslim women as anything other 
than rape victims. Silence became a sign of victimization, proof of the trauma of rape. 
Women were silent, it was assumed, because they had been shamed. When Bosnian 
Muslim women spoke of rape or were assumed to have been raped because of their 
silence, they became solely defined by rape. Revenge or other associated thoughts were 
seen as a product of the sexual violence. If one wanted to join the army or even expressed 
vengeance, they were seen as exceptional or pathological. Once rape was involved 
women could be or do nothing else.95 Journalist Alexandra Stiglmayer was one such 
woman who equated the desire for revenge with atypical behavior.96  She stated that most 
women who were raped were broken and unable to think about such things as revenge; 
therefore, those who did so were not normal.97Stiglmayer also suggested that most 
‘victims’ were powerless, unable to even take care of their families.98 Psychiatrists also 
noted that women who have become pregnant as a result are often suicidal, but after an 
abortion their symptoms turn to aggression.99
To expand on the assumptions about women’s other roles in war Engle cites 
Diane Conklin, who stated, “Men fight other men in war. As a general rule, this is true. It 
is also generally true that women do not fight wars, though they may contribute in other 
 These scenarios offer women very little 
agency: revenge is pathological, potential mothers are suicidal, and rape leaves women 
‘broken’. It seems that no matter what response women have after rape it is explained to 
be as a result of the trauma she experienced. By explaining every reaction in relation to 
rape, there are little options for women to express themselves without one of these 
stigmas being attached to their actions. Therefore, after experiencing sexual violence 
women are solely defined by rape.   
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ways to a war effort”.100 Not only does the assumption negatively affect, but men as well. 
Men as a whole must be the aggressors in war, never mind the fact that many men do not 
actively participate in war, but may “contribute in other ways to the war effort.”   This 
effectively deletes women’s political agency during war as well. Engle also cites the loss 
of any real ethnic identity as feminists, who came to see rape as genocide, assumed a 
simplistic understanding of ethnic identity.101
Nevertheless, in the Mucić case the ICTY found rape to constitute torture and 
therefore a grave breach under both the Geneva Convention and a violation of the laws 
and customs of war (ICTY).
 It is clear that as one reflects upon the 
assumptions about women’s place in war it is not surprising that women have been 
relegated to only victim. Furthermore because women’s political agency is taken away by 
feminism and the law it is obvious that women are incapable of being violators or 
villains.   
102 In the Furundžija case the Tribunal widened the scope of 
rape stating that rape may be considered an act of genocide, even though this case in 
particular did not convict Anto Furundžija of rape as genocide.103 The ICTY has also 
provided definitions of actus reus, for conduct engaged in voluntarily, and mens rea, for 
conduct engaged in with the thought of its wrongfulness, for sexual offenses and rape.104 
As of 2011, the ICTY has convicted 28 individuals for their responsibility for crimes of 
sexual violence and since the Tribunal started its work, 78 individuals of the 161 accused, 
were indicted with charges of sexual violence.105 The ICTY Statute specifically lists rape 
as a crime against humanity; this could also be considered of sign of feminist 
advocacy.106 Still, there are feminists who criticize the ICTY citing that the number of 
women in important positions within the ICTY itself remains low and that the Tribunal 
has not done enough to delineate specific crimes of sexual violence.107
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priorities of the advocates and reaffirms the importance of law, because many were 
disappointed with the work of the ICTY this only enforces the idea that the Tribunal and 
international law are the foremost platform for ‘aiding women’. Engle also cites, 
Charlesworth and Chinkin who were both upset by the failure of the ICTY "to make 
explicit that any rape committed in armed conflict is a war crime, entail[ing] the risk of 
creating the assumption that 'lesser' rapes may still be committed with impunity".108
It is clear that despite many feminist advocates indicating otherwise, the ICTY did 
not inspire a strong feminist movement. Instead most feminists were consumed by the 
idea of the victim and defining certain terms to their satisfaction. This rhetoric furthers 
the debates away from seeing women as violators and rests upon the idea that in order for 
women’s suffering in conflict to be alleviated one must continue to view women as 
needing special protection in front of the law.  MacKinnon’s contribution, along with 
countless other feminists, solidified the importance of law within especially in the 
aftermath of conflict. The idea of the female victim, in this case, is very helpful not only 
towards pushing for more protection of women in law, but for restating the importance of 
the neoliberal agenda as well.  It is as if in this sense feminist used the confines of 
neoliberalism in order to further their aims of creating a better place for women. This is 
especially troubling seeing as it is the neoliberal system that is suspect for victimizing 
women. Feminists who advocated around the tribunals as well as stated arguments for the 
use of more law ultimately advance the neoliberal moment; albeit unintentional 
MacKinnon’s work also serves neoliberalism. Using the system that is supported by 
neoliberalism only supports its goals and in continually restating that women are the 
victim in war approves neoliberalisms reliance on the victimization of others. There can 
be no use of neoliberalism that does not restate its own importance. The only way to 
combat this is to subvert the system entirely. How different would the aftermath of the 
Yugoslavian conflict look if it was not viewed through the lens of the ICTY, or if the 
ICTY was established upon an entirely different discourse? 
  
However, despite criticisms most feminists viewed the ICTY as a step in the right 
direction.  
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B. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 The ICTR has been lauded as a model for the handling of sexual violence crimes. The 
ICTR was the first to convict rape as a crime against humanity and rape as an instrument 
of genocide in the acclaimed Akayesu case.109 The term rape was defined as, “a physical 
invasion of a sexual nature under circumstances that are coercive” and sexual violence as, 
“any act of a sexual nature … under circumstances which are coercive”.110 Kelly Askin, 
in her article, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the ICTR, states the ICTR has failed to 
continue the success of the Akayesu case and the gender jurisprudence outside of the 
Akayesu case has been far from adequate considering how common sexual violence was 
during the conflict.111 Askin also notes that there was very little effort by the Prosecutor’s 
office to investigate the allegations of sexual violence. Despite the many issues of the 
ICTR, Askin also writes on the positive aspects the ICTR contributed to gender 
crimes.112 Askin notes that judges would often discuss gender crimes in the judgments of 
trials that did not include gender crimes in the original indictment, a way of keeping 
gender crimes in the jurisprudence.113  In the Kayishema and Ruzindana case, although it 
did not include sexual violence in the indictment, the Trial Chamber did make reference 
to the rapes committed during the conflict and the large scale of sexual violence.114
 Within the confines of this paper the above would be celebrated in a sense, the 
idea that the ICTR did not advance sexual violence in law as much as it should or could 
have. It could be said that the ICTR aided the argument presented here because the ICTR 
did not use law in order to solidify women as victim, so it could protect women from the 
violence done to them. Judges were not equipped, investigators were less prepared than 
 The 
ICTR was limiting, due to its lack of equipped investigators, women’s stories were not 
properly heard, and unless a witness, by chance, told her own story in court we would 
have never had the Akayesu decision.  
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desired, and despite the prevalence of sexual violence it did not take center stage in the 
proceedings. This could be seen as positive within the arguments of this paper, as this 
shows that despite the universal urge to protect women in law, the court was not as 
successful as it ought to have been, theoretically leaving room from women to be seen as 
something other than the helpless victim. However, it would be completely wrong to 
argue that the ICTR ‘aided’ women even in this sense because what issues were present 
concerning women were not due to the fact that the court in its wisdom, did not want to 
victimize women by confining them to narrow definitions, instead the court was guilty of 
pure sexual discrimination. This discrimination cannot be said to be seen as helping 
women out of victim status. This discrimination encouraged the viewpoint that these 
women were not of real value to begin with. The ICTR was ill equipped and ill managed 
and instead of undergoing the possibility of a discussion of women in the law the ICTR 
ignored that women even existed.  
There were other cases that have been cited as aiding in gender crime 
jurisprudence. Laurent Semanza, bourgemestre of Bicumbi, was not originally indicted 
for rape crimes, but the indictment was amended to include sexual violence. Semanza 
was convicted of six of the counts he was charged with, including complicity in genocide, 
and extermination, torture, rape and murder as crimes against humanity. Of the two acts 
of rape as crimes against humanity, only one was sustained. The Trial Chamber 
concluded that the relevant paragraphs of the Amended Indictment 'provide insufficient 
notice to the Accused' and acquitted Semanza on rape as a crime against humanity.115 It 
was established that Sylvestre Gacumbitsi used a megaphone to urge Hutu men to 
commit rape and he was convicted of three counts: genocide, extermination, and rape as 
crimes against humanity. Each of these convictions included sexual violence and it was 
established that sexual penetration with genitals or a foreign object constitutes rape.116
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the media to harm women and incite violence, yet the indictments do not concretely 
discuss the sexual violence.117 However, sexual violence was mentioned in the genocide 
section of the judgment.118 While the ICTR did influence sexual violence jurisprudence it 
is also important to note that the court has been cited in general as being mismanaged, 
evidence from the lack of sexual violence in the initial indictments.119
Janet Halley in her article, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the 
Criminalization of Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, noted 
that it was a female judge with significant experience in gender crimes, Judge 
Navanethem Pillay, who, while sitting on the Akayesu case, intervened after hearing the 
testimony of a witness.
  
120 Her intervention lead to the trial being suspended and an 
investigation started in order to prove the existence of sexual violence crimes.121 
Feminists along with feminist NGOs then urged the indictments to include rape and 
sexual violence.122
One such criticism by feminists was that the ICTR investigators were less than 
adequate. Galina Nelarva in, The Impact of Transnational Advocacy Networks on the 
Prosecution of Wartime Rape and Sexual Violence: the Case of the ICTR, cites Elizabth 
Neuffer, who states that the investigators were mostly white males, who had no 
experience in dealing with these specific crimes, the reference to the investigators 
appearance was made to illustrate the reason why many women did not feel comfortable 
talking about their experiences to the investigators.
 The problem with this was that crimes of a sexual nature were not 
included in many of the indictments in the first place. This makes one believe that if it 
had not been for the spontaneous testimony of one witness as well as the presence of a 
female judge then the landmark Akayesu case would not have been one at all. 
123
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direct relation to the investigations taking place, such as a lack of attention by the 
prosecutor’s investigation on rape and sexual violence, lack of communication between 
the investigation teams and the trial teams, and lack of skills of the investigators.124 It 
appears that the investigators have been cited by almost everyone who has written on the 
issues as lacking any effort to actually investigate crimes of sexual violence. The 
investigators lacked sufficient training but, not in investigative skills rather they had no 
training to elicit information about sexual violence and this seriously damaged the 
effectiveness of the investigations.125
Prosecutors, Richard Goldstone, Louise Arbour, and Carla Del Ponte, had assured 
that rape and sexual violence would be properly addressed, yet feminists have stated that 
there was no strategy in place to do so.
 
126 This is another point most writings agrees 
upon, which is, lack of credible effort by the prosecution. Under Del Ponte, the sexual 
assault team was dismantled and in an effort to speed up cases some of the charges were 
eliminated, rape charges were the easiest to cut.127 Under prosecutor Hassan Jallow there 
was said to be severe mismanagement and genocide suspects were hired as investigators, 
which decreased the likelihood that crimes of rape and sexual violence were able to be 
substantiated or that those who experienced sexual violence would come forward with 
their stories.128
Catharine Mackinnon, in the article, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 
states that the prosecutors often did not charge rape when murder charges were 
present.
  
129
“A parallel judicial pattern can be discerned in the seeming reluctance of the 
Tribunal, at times, to hold a man responsible for a sexual violation another man 
committed, when it is willing to hold the same man responsible for murder 
 MacKinnon states,  
                                                   
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id.at 10. 
127Id. at 25. The reasoning behind why rape charges were so easily dropped needs to be examined on a case 
by case basis. William Fenrick, former Senior Legal Adviser to the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, said that 
the ICTR might have been less concerned with rape and sexual violence seeing as the genocide in Rwanda 
was overshadowing everything else.  
128 Id.at 11. 
129 Catharine MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW ENG. J. INTL. & COMP. L 211, 
214-215 (2008).   
34 
 
committed on virtually the same evidence, at the same time and place, by and 
against the same people.”130
 
  
The tribunal found it difficult to charge men, not with the acts they committed 
themselves, but, acts that other man committed on their behalf, which was key when 
accusing one of inciting rape.131 MacKinnon further states that the underlying impression 
given the prosecutors is that men would not likely commit murder without orders, yet 
they would rape on their own without the orders of a superior.132 This, she says, falls into 
the ‘boy-will-be-boys’ theme and shows that the Tribunal does not believe that the rapes 
were truly the leaders fault. MacKinnon also states that the willingness to drop rape 
charges, as previously noted, was present especially when murder charges were retained 
shows the lack of importance of rape, to the Tribunal. MacKinnon describes that there 
seems to be a higher standard of credibility for witnesses to rape than for witness to 
murder and that all of these instances combine demonstrate a push towards impunity.133
What is most apparent in the literature of the ICTR is that everyone, in some way 
or another was disappointed. There was a lack of financial resources, political will, 
administrative and technical problems, survivors-witnesses were not protected properly, 
and sexual violence, though it was widely known to be widespread throughout the 
conflict did not take center stage.
  
134 Galina Nelarva writes, “Genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity must "shock the conscience of mankind" to qualify as 
international. Whether or not rape and sexual violence should be viewed in such terms is 
largely a determination made by legal professionals, primarily the Chief Prosecutor.”135
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The point in bringing up this issue is not to wish for a different prosecutor, but to see the 
entire system as suspect.  As stated earlier by Anderson, the formation of Tribunals is 
through the UN Security Council, and therefore subject to the desires of its members. To 
this aim Chief Prosecutors put in charge of said Tribunals can be seen as politically 
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driven as well. Therefore it is not hard to understand why Tribunals are so deeply 
imbedded in neoliberalism.       
It is not just law and its application in the court room that affects people, it is the 
mechanism in and surrounding law, strengthened by advocates, public opinion, and the 
decisions made by states in power. All of these factors effectively strengthen laws reach, 
which is why it is important when viewing the status of women in international law; one 
must view all of these elements in conjunction.  Human rights and international law have 
both become way to ensure the spread of Western tendencies. Through the 
universalization of the human rights discourse the West has been able to solidify its 
vision and goals; the concepts of human rights are known and accepted by all, which 
allows policy disguised by humanitarian language to bare more weight. Since the world is 
now united in its belief that women are oppressed and need to be saved, as is the 
explanation behind wars and humanitarian missions in various countries, the world is also 
united in its understanding of how to deal with this oppression.136
Law that defines sexual violence is seen as helping women. Those advocates who 
surrounded the ICTY and the ICTR not only aid in the production of the neo-liberal 
moment but redefine the naturalization of human rights. Despite that women around law 
have disagreed over exact definitions of terms or whether the Tribunals were effective or 
not, they all still point to the importance of Empire and aid in its production because it is 
around law that they pin their struggle. When journalists were frustrated because more 
women would not admit to having been raped, as noted earlier, they themselves defined 
this current moment. Through the use of human rights and international law Empire has 
been able to produce new categories made to sustain itself; the role of women is 
paramount to this production. Forcing women through the law to discuss sexual violence, 
assuming all women are rape in war, and only defining women by their relation to sexual 
violence, mold law and advocate the need to restrain women from realizing another 
narrative. Law, in its universal approach, does not need multiple views of women, 
women as political or military actors. That is why in law there is only the example of 
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women as victims, as there is no room in neoliberalism for alternative views. Empire has 
produced victimized subjects. 
If the current discourse is not helpful in preventing violence against women then 
it would seem to be necessary for a disillusion of the issue entirely. The thought that 
neoliberalism can be used to further women’s issues is false. Neoliberalism is able to 
consume all difference, allowing this difference to exist assuming it does not pose a 
threat to the system’s order. Women are a difference that exists within the system, but 
cause no threat because they have been made to play the perpetual victim; women are the 
excuse for so many neoliberal agendas, that which the neoliberal strategy rests on, the 
need for a victim.137
Many would argue that in the aftermath of conflicts, where sexual violence is 
deployed against women, one must deal with the issue at hand that is how to deal with 
violators and ‘repair’ victims. It is important to note that it is not being suggested that 
those who cause harm to others should continually go unchecked, but in this issues 
especially there is no better moment to look at the way common themes of victimhood 
have perpetuated the system and caused the very violence the courts seek to address. If 
framing these situations within the law, the law that at present sees women as one 
dimensional, does not benefit women, then would it not be better to remove the issue 
entirely from the purview of the courts and instead examine where the law is guilty of 
harming women in its application.     
 Even the critique that feminists who use the neoliberal system to 
their aim is somehow a form of subversion, is untrue. These advocates do so by counting 
women as weak, in need of protection, they advance stereotypes, and ignore other factors 
of women’s participation in war. Not only is this building up the neoliberal agenda, but it 
harms women in the long run. Despite their intentions feminists and advocates, who 
define their struggle in this way, are aiding neoliberalism. No matter what the temporary 
perceived gains are there can be no excuse for further relegating women towards victim 
status.  
 One needs to go beyond Engle and Halley’s work that states protection of women 
in law only serves to further victimize women. This is not enough because during the 
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process of criminalizing sexual violence, to such a degree, one thereby makes it all the 
more prominent. Sexual violence is elevated to a position that it becomes attractive and in 
effect occurs more often with this idea in mind. If a group of women who have been 
raped is seen as being shamed, like Engle notes many feminists used as a way to 
advocate, then rape is all the more desirable to the aggressors of war. Rape and sexual 
violence becomes more of a tool because it is cited by the international community as 
holding such an important value. Likewise, those who were exposed to sexual violence 
are also subjected to the predetermination of their actions afterwards, which solely 
defined them as victims. This is a link that, through the evidence presented above, is 
inevitable when increasing laws protective power and when advocates intervene on 
behalf of those involved in conflict.  
What is now necessary is to couple the previous critique with a simultaneous 
correspondence of terror. This correspondence of terror is to afford women the notion of 
fear; to fear women, to see women as perpetrators, and villains then allows women the 
benefit of agency as well as the sense control. It is not being suggested that women are 
never associated with negative connotations, being described as cunning, devious, and 
manipulative is not unheard of or out of the ordinary. Many would counter this paper’s 
argument, that women are not seen as villains, with examples of women’s cunning and 
intellectual deceptiveness. In literature there are many examples of women deploying 
these less than desirable characters, but what this paper is suggesting is a step away from 
these manipulative descriptions and a move to prioritize the importance of terror, as terror 
is something quite different. To be physically terrified of someone is an extremely 
different description entirely. To be considered to be so powerful that one fears one’s life, 
or fears bodily harm is a notion that now needs to be consistently associated with women. 
If this is achieved, a state where women are seen as physically dangerous, this not only 
balances the relations between men and women, but does so especially in times of 
conflict. 
Rarely is the idea of women as powerful, physically harmful agents celebrated, 
possibly because rejoicing in the fact that women are dangerous creates a paradox of 
sorts.  The idea that women commit crimes and physically harm others is not only 
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unsettling for many feminists, but for international law as well. Biljana Plavšić and 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, are the only two women that have been indicted by the ICTY 
and ICTR respectfully. Biljana Plavšić, the former Serb president of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, was charged with counts of genocide and crimes against humanity, 
although these charges were dropped when she pled guilty to lesser charges.138 During 
her trial it was pointed out that she was the only person to have accepted responsibility 
and shown contrition.139 It was suspected that she entered a guilty plea to earn a reduced 
sentence, which she did when the prosecutor dropped the genocide charge. She was 
sentenced to 11 years, but was released in 2009 after serving three fourths of the sentence 
due to her acknowledged reformation.140 Even while she was considered outside of 
normal female behavior, her guilty plea which lead to her reduced sentenced and 
subsequent early release is in line with the narrative of a repentant female sinner. Even 
when witnesses were called to condemn Plavšić they pointed out her contrition.141 
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, former Minister of Family and Women’s Affairs, was charged 
with genocide and crimes against humanity, which included inciting Hutu men to rape 
Tutsi women.142 She was eventually sentenced to life imprisonment.143 People expressed 
shock as Nyiramasuhuko stands trail, as she looked like a dear aunt and not a killer.144 
The media also painted Nyiramasuhuko as a monster, assumingly subconsciously or 
otherwise to distance her from the qualities of a ‘true’ woman.145
In conflict situations on as large of a scale as these two, it is unthinkable that only 
two women have been brought before international tribunals. While a great deal more 
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have been indicted in local courts, there is something to be said about the international 
community’s reaction to women who commit crimes. International law, written from the 
perspective that women are by default the perpetual victim has little to contribute when 
women are seen as the violator. International law and society both reiterate over and over 
that women are the victim, women are not the violator, and likewise women in war need 
to be protected and saved. The cases of Biljana Plavšić and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 
women in power who used their position to cause harm, are an aberration and decidedly 
not the norm.  
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IV. Abu Ghraib 
In 2004, 60 Minutes II featured a story on prisoner abuse highlighting the Abu Ghraib 
prison in Iraq.146 The classified report and CDROM that was leaked to the show triggered 
a wave of response and criticism against the US government’s operation in Iraq. The 
story documented with pictures, the horrendous abuse of Iraqi’s at the hands of US 
soldiers.147 The pictures, disturbing to say the least, show naked men in inhumane 
positions with smiling US soldiers in the background, a Iraqi man fitted with a dog collar 
and leash, soldiers next to dead bodies giving a thumbs up, and Iraqi men forced into 
torturous positions at the hands of their captures.148 When The Guardian published these 
pictures they entitled them, The Images that Shamed America; this situation was now in 
the public and unavoidable. The debates started in the media and around the world, but 
quickly the debates became centered on a new focus, it was as if examining the pictures 
further people realized that the US soldiers were not all men; there were women involved 
in these atrocities as well.149 It was a female US solider that was holding the other end of 
the dog leash, it was a female US soldier giving a thumbs up next to a dead body and 
behind a pile of naked and handcuffed Iraqi men. These women have done the 
unthinkable and yet they are women, who should seemingly know better.150
Many people could not come to grips with the reality of the way these women 
voluntarily acted. These photos challenged the stereotypes of women because as it was 
said that women are expected to be morally superior to men, women do not behave this 
way, women are better than this.
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Barbara Ehrenreich , in her article, Feminism’s Assumptions Upended, states that, 
“A certain kind of feminism, or perhaps I should say a certain kind of feminist naivete, 
died in Abu Ghraib.”152 She further states that, especially in war, men were seen as the 
perpetual violators and women the forever victim; therefore, sexual violence against 
women was the root of all.153 The problem she further explains is that this type of 
feminism, one so many fall into the trap of, believed that if only women were integrated 
in to all parts of society that things would get better. This assumes that women, as they 
inhabit traditional male dominated careers, would work for goodness and strive for 
change.154   Ehrenreich states, that to assume gender equality can in itself bring about a 
better world is “lazy” and “self-indulgent”.155 Seeing women who assimilate into once 
male dominated fields as a victory for humanity is wrong, as it also assumes women as a 
group only have one struggle, as if gender equality can solve all of the world’s 
problems.156
Mary Jo Melone further amplified these sentiments, in her article, We’ve Come a 
Long, and Wrong Way, stating,  
 This also somehow misses the point that while assimilating into male 
dominated positions one is not then subjected to male stereotypes, which are just as 
limiting and harmful as female stereotypes. Becoming ‘one of the boys’, an all too 
common dilemma for females in male dominated sectors,  is a trope that needs to be 
examined not just because it harms women who assimilate but the men in these positions 
as well, men that may not fit into such predetermined masculine roles.  
“I can't get that picture of England out of my head because this is not how women 
are expected to behave. Feminism taught me 30 years ago that not only had 
women gotten a raw deal from men, we were morally superior to them. When it 
came to distinguishing right from wrong, the needle of our compass always 
pointed to true north.”157
 
 
 Melone continues to question why women committed these abuses, and after her 
attempts to almost find an excuse for the violence she recognizes her tendency to not 
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believe that women are capable of such acts.158 Melone writes that, yes women have 
achieved equality, but it is perverse, women can now behave as badly as men.159
Karen Engle, in her article Judging Sex in War, takes note of Ehrenreich’s 
position but thinks it is slightly over generalized.
 This 
statement is extremely useful for understanding the greater circumstances present; 
evidence of women engaging in torturous acts makes one question the very distinction 
society has created between men and women. It also questions if gender equality, in the 
typical liberal feminist ideal, is the proper struggle? If women are pushing to be equal to 
men, then what is it that women are exactly pushing for? Is it satisfying to know that, 
now women can behave just as badly as men, or rather now women can inhabit the same 
gendered characteristics as men? 
160 She discusses that there are cases of 
women committing acts of terror and while these are said to be evident throughout 
literature; however, she also notes that these acts, committed by women, usually involve 
shame or guilt.161  This point made by Engle misses the greater issues, while there are 
examples of women committing atrocities in literature and in everyday life there is 
always, as Engle suggest, an association to guilt and shame. Engle misses the key 
element because she immediately associates the crimes women commit to the importance 
of their shame.162
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 It is as if women, being women, should have known better and 
therefore are expected to display signs of remorse; this brings one back to stereotypical 
images. Women have been seen as ‘bearers of the nation’, the Fourth Geneva Convention 
even associated women with family honor; therefore, if women are bestowed with these 
magnanimous gifts then they should display the proper signs of judgment and morality. It 
is not being suggested that men should not or do not display remorse, the appropriate 
human emotion should be sorrowful; however, like in the situation in Abu Ghraib it was 
the women who gained most of the attention in the media and it was Lynndie England 
who made headlines when she announced that she felt no need to apologize (Estes, 2012). 
Thus it becomes a situation where women who commit crimes and feel sorry are not seen 
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as appalling, as those who commit crimes and do not feel any sort of emotion. It is then 
not the crime but the lack of sympathy or empathy that makes these women appear 
outside the normal realm of ‘womanhood’ and something to be studied.  
In the article, Gender (In) Visibility at Abu Ghraib, Marita Gronnvoll explains 
how women are inevitably linked to gender while men are not.163 In war, especially 
within the military itself, women are viewed as a source of pollution and are required to 
be stripped of their femininity.164 Even the typical notion of a warrior excludes 
women.165 Gronncoll, when comparing England to fellow male soldiers, also responsible 
for such atrocities, further states that, “Not surprisingly then, the media coverage of 
England’s behavior at Abu Ghraib focuses on her failure to behave as a woman should, 
whereas the media coverage of Graner’s behavior focuses on his failure to behave as an 
honorable soldier should.”166 This situation develops the ‘human-soldier’ dilemma, I pose 
this dilemma because it brings one to the heart of the issue, when England was being 
chastised in the media for her actions it was made clear that she failed, not as a soldier 
but as a women. England failed to act the way she ought to, predetermined by her sex, her 
actions are therefore a slap in the face to all women everywhere, military or not. The 
reason this undermines “female values” is because these less desirable values are so often 
ignored by feminists. As stated previously, it is as if the recognition of these lesser 
qualities would uproot all of the gains women have made. This claim is further justified 
by the strong reactions garnered by the discovery of the photos.167 In essence England 
failed in her role as a human, her humanness being centered upon the fact that she is 
female. Her male colleagues were just shown as bad soldiers, their actions related to their 
career alone, and were never associated with their inability to act like a man should. 
There is an interesting binary present concerning the male soldiers, they were cited as 
being bad at their job and not bad men, gender was not discussed as such.168
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 It is as if 
male identity is associated with work, work for men in their gender, or an expression 
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thereof. Women were berated for being bad people; the emphasis being on the fact that 
they were women. Their job was seen as something they do, but their gender was a 
separate issue. It appears women must, while in the workplace, disassociate their job and 
their gender ‘duties’ and always make the better decision based on gender, as it is the 
standard they are held up to.  It is hard to believe that there is one person who is not 
shocked by these acts and for a moment deploys some of the very same reactions as the 
literature suggests above, which states, women are not supposed to act like the female 
soldiers did in Abu Ghraib. Abu Ghraib and the debates that resulted are just the initial 
glimpse into the ways gender and sex is viewed in the public. 
Shannon Holland cites Judith Butler’s notion that ‘natural’ gender identities and 
behaviors requires the disciplining of performative acts that might disturb the coherence 
of sex and gender categories.169 The act of labeling performances as subversive also goes 
against the normalcy of binary sex and gender categories.170
“When particular acts of gender transgression, perceived to be extraordinary in 
nature, become highly visible in public discourse, the ‘‘containing’’ of those acts 
often entails the reproduction and circulation of elaborate narratives that explain 
the ‘‘abnormalities’’ in normative ways”.
 Holland states,  
171
 
 
The media scrutinized England’s upbringing and lifestyle. England was cited as “trailer 
trash” and branded as an adulterer, these depictions helped the media suggest England’s 
failure as a women and a soldier was associated with her upbringing and low morals. The 
problem is that these same news articles did not mention the class or morality of the 
males involved in the atrocities.172
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 Charles Graner was one of the male soldiers cited with 
orchestrating much of the torture, yet he was never questioned about his background or 
morals. It is by the construction of the story surrounding England’s background that one 
tries to explain or offer excuses as to why England did not uphold her gender. The acts of 
those female soldiers do not fall in line with the gender norms that females are expected 
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to portray. Since these acts are seen as opposite from the normal they need to be policed 
and explained.  
Another issue that one encounters is, by calling out England’s gender attention is 
brought to the fact that she has not behaved as a women should.173  It is not just those 
who blatantly call out England and the other female soldiers for not acting as women 
should, it is even those well meaning authors who are trying to make sense of the actions 
of women, authors who see their own reactions as problematic. This is not to say women 
need to be treated as their male colleagues. It is not beneficial for women to be treated as 
men when men face equally restrictive gender roles. These debates that have surfaced as 
a result of the photos from Abu Ghraib, in which the authors wrestle and try to come to 
terms with their own stereotypical reactions, bring gender stereotypes back into the light 
and reinforce the fact that something about these female soldiers is very wrong. By 
stating and restating that people were shocked, because it was women who were seen 
committing these horrid acts, one polices gender. It is Holland who writes that people 
were preoccupied after the release of the photos, trying to make sense of a female 
torturer.174 Since one sees these women’s actions are cited as shocking, shocking for 
women, then one also acquiesces to the fact that these women are not properly 
showcasing their gender. Constantly discussing the gendered aspects of these women’s 
involvement takes attention away from the fact that there are other issues present: racism, 
discrimination against religion, power dynamics, as well as many others. As Butler 
suggested, England, who did not successfully repeat her own gender, is now something 
that needs to be explained.175
This idea clearly is interesting to note in relation to Butlers claim about sex and 
gender. If sex and gender are linked and equally cultured then why is it that men were not 
seen in relation to their gender? For many, gender in men does not bare weight. It is as if 
gender in men is fact. People accept it and do not call it to question whenever a man acts 
 England is an anomaly and it is important to show her as 
something outside what is acceptable behavior for a women.  
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unless of course it is outside their normal preconceived acts.176 Butler’s idea of a sissy 
boy is important, he is bullied and picked on because he does not enjoy acting or 
engaging in traditional male acts.177 If a male soldier was in Abu Ghraib and emotionally 
distraught at the acts committed or even reported his fellow soldiers, then his gender 
would almost certainly be called into question by his fellow comrades. The acts 
committed by men went unnoticed by many, as some believe this is sadly typical 
behavior for men. Catherine MacKinnon has stated that especially in the situations of 
sexual violence there is the predominate claim that ‘boys-will-be-boys’, this idea is 
important in this situation because many if not all of the acts pictured in Abu Ghraib 
involved a form of sexual abuse.178 It is as if men by their very definition are expected to 
engage in such demeaning activities.179
Gronnvoll notes, “From basic training on, soldiers in training are taught that to be 
warriors is to reject all that is feminine”.
  
180 It is as if women in the military suffer from 
an insurmountable task. In order to belong they most repeat the gender of their male peers 
yet they must not blend in too much because they still need to retain their feminine 
qualities. Zillah Eisenstein in her article, Sexual Humiliation, Gender Confusion and the 
Horrors at Abu Ghraib, writes that the female soldiers involved in the atrocities in Abu 
Ghraib are “gender decoys”.181 Eisenstein notes that the women create ambiguity because 
they are participating in torture of a sexual nature, to which their own gender is usually 
subjected to. She further states that this switching of gender leaves masculine gender 
intact.182
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 It is not then, that these women are subverting gender they are instead 
strengthening gender. The male gender remains visible and the negative aspects are that 
much stronger. It is as if women who employ these characteristics are stating that this 
gender, despite its stereotypical flaws, is so desirable that it is necessary to try to emulate 
it. So called “subverting” the female gender in order to replace it with another gender is 
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not subversion. It is protecting a male gender that in so many ways has been a reason for 
the discrimination against women in the first place.  
Orna Sasson-Levy in the article, Feminism and Military Gender Practices: Israeli 
Women Soldiers in "Masculine" Roles, writes that women soldiers in “masculine” roles 
adopt characteristic of male combat soldiers, which she states shows both resistance to 
and compliance with the military gender order.183 On one hand these women are refusing 
to accept military definitions of femininity and masculinity are in a way subversive. 
However, women’s adoption of masculine identity practices can be interpreted as 
collaboration with the military norms. When women mimic combat soldiers, they confine 
themselves to a perception that identifies the soldier as masculine and no longer 
challenges, the gendered military order.184
This point made by Sasson-Levy is complicated. Women and men are seen as two 
separate entities in the military, defined by very traditional roles; however, by women 
adopting these male dominated roles they create a problem within this notion of 
subversion. It is by mimicking male characteristics that women reinforce stereotypes and 
state, femininity is in no way desirable or beneficial, solidifying the difference between 
the two. While the concepts of masculinity and femininity are dually oppressive, through 
reproducing masculinity in this way women almost celebrate this difference and 
 The, not always, but sometimes destructive 
military persona, like one saw in Abu Ghraib, or one reads about when soldiers are in 
military court for sexually abusing civilians is only that much more protected. Military 
culture deserves its one analysis entirely, yet in this focus the link between the military 
gender norms is important to note. Women for so long have remained outside of the 
military’s purview so infiltrating the ranks in any way would seem positive, yet doing so 
while strengthening the often oppressive male gender is not. It is not my argument that 
these women in Abu Ghraib were not capable of committing these crimes were it not for 
the military culture surrounding them, to do so would be to push women back to 
impressionable small minded individuals; however, these women as members of the 
military have equal blame in where these gender roles fall.  
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categorize masculinity as superior. By female soldiers reproducing the gender of male 
soldiers, this is not a form of rebellion this is, as Eisenstein noted, keeping gender in 
place.  
Sasson-Levy’s thought of subversion is certainly not the subversion Butler notes, 
she calls for, “miming and displacing traditional conventions of hegemonic 
heterosexuality”.185 These acts do not challenge the hegemonic heterosexuality of 
masculinity but rather, as noted above, celebrate it; these acts redefine the very 
hegemonic forces that construct it. Eisenstein also wrote that mimicking men is not 
equality, especially in light of Abu Ghriab, so therefore mimicking is not a way to dispel 
one’s own gender, rather is reinforces gender.186 Would it not be more useful for these 
women to blur genders entirely? Butler notes the examples of a tomboy or a sissy boy, 
two instances where gender is blurred and almost undefined.187 This idea of something 
being undefined is what subversion would seem to truly mean, these women soldiers are 
not blurring they are rather repeating acts of gender, as Butler states, actual subversion 
cannot be gauged or calculated.188
 England acted outside of her purview as a soldier and women, calling 
neoliberalism into question. In neoliberal terms England did not conform to the status of 
victim, like all women should; therefore, her gender is used by the media as a way to shift 
focus from the war and other violence taking place. These women involved are 
sensationalized as an aberration. They are used in order to clearly state that what they did 
is wrong, not wrong in the sense that violence is wrong; on the contrary violence is 
paramount to the importance of Empire. What they did is wrong because it does not fall 
in the role within Empire as either solider or women, i.e. discrete promoter of violence or 
victim. England challenges neoliberalism and so in this way she must be explained and 
rejected.  Neoliberalism cannot use a physically strong female, disregarding what she did 
was criminal, her actions as a violator are not welcomed by Empire. The reasons that 
Empire does not condone the behavior of these women give all the more support for the 
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importance of seeing women as violators. What better reason to celebrate the actions of 
the women in Abu Ghraib than to encourage the subversion of neoliberalism.  
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V. Conclusion 
The importance of seeing women as violators of crimes cannot be overstated. 
International law and those surrounding law continue to reinforce women’s status as 
victims. Continuing to view women in the aftermath of conflicts in need of special 
protection solidifies women as a part of the victim the narrative. Neoliberalism uses the 
tools of human rights and international law around the world to regulate the flow of the 
market, to disguise the reasons behind wars, and to better control the particular brand of 
democracy that is spread. The victim is paramount to this process; it is used as the reason 
for wars, and for the influx of aid and NOGs, which in reality are considerably less 
concerned with people and more concerned with influencing governments. Women are a 
common theme to unite around and used accordingly. Difference, such as women or 
minorities, is accepted by Neoliberalism as long as they do not affect its end goals.  
Tribunals aid in this moment because they reproduce the female victim by 
increasing the protection afforded to women after conflict and by producing a narrative 
through law that shows women only on the receiving end of violence. This is further 
exemplified by the fact that in the ICTY and ICTR, two major examples of international 
law and human rights, only have convicted two women respectively. These Tribunals 
emphatically state that women are victims, which in turn justifies wars and the ‘need’ for 
further aid. Feminists, whether on purpose or without intention, aid in neoliberalism by 
encouraging more law. By the mere fact of debating over legal definitions around these 
Tribunals they thereby legitimize their existence. An alternative discourse is to decrease 
the protection of women in law, as it only victimizes and defines women to narrow roles, 
at the same time increasing the prevalence of women violators in international law. 
Arresting and trying more women on an international scale is useful for offering women a 
larger narrative in conflict. The goal is not to be seen as men, but to be realized to be a 
human capable of all forms of expression, good and bad.  
Abu Ghraib is especially useful, as is showcases that women do actively 
participate in violence. Clearly, there are gender issues present, when women reproduce 
masculine roles which are just as problematic as classic female representations; however, 
these actions more importantly augment one’s perception, changing viewpoints about the 
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ways in which women need to and do act. It is clear then why so many wished to explain 
away England's behavior, she did not take the victim role and she did not support 
neoliberalism the way a proper soldier should have. Because England is outside the 
neoliberal framework she is casted out by her upbringing, her actions, and her gender. 
She is seen as an aberration because neoliberalism cannot use women who are violent 
capable agents, Abu Ghraib subverts neoliberalism. Abu Ghraib also adds the final layer 
to the argument, that in order for perception to change one needs to couple the idea of 
less protection in law and more women seen as violating crimes, with the realization that 
women are physically powerful agents. Women who are seen as agents of terror add the 
final element that would truly offer the most protection for women; better than law and 
better than more advocates are women who without reproach are able to automatically 
instill the fear of physical harm.  
Had the ICTY and ICTR been framed differently, had advocates not clamored for 
more law, and had more women been tried at the international level then the discourse 
could have been more beneficial to women, allowing the law to showcase the different 
instances of female expression in war. If Abu Ghriab would not have been framed as an 
aberration and fluke it could have offered another example of women in power. Due to 
neoliberalism and its wide reach issues and law are framed in a certain manor that 
promotes the victim status of women. Until people begin to subvert this by in a sense 
celebrating female violators, there will be continued violence against women as their 
victim status will be used and exploited. The importance now is that different discourses 
are present in order to offer women the best possible situation for the future. It is 
necessary to see women as agents capable of committing crimes, and to understand that 
law in its current form is responsible for reinforcing the representation of a weak 
defenseless victim. To say women are violent, women commit crimes, and women are 
capable of physical harm is at odds with international law and at odds with the 
comfortableness one has when one speaks of women, but to acknowledge these ‘lesser’ 
qualities is to afford women the opportunity of being a powerful agent, one that bares no 
preset definition.  
     
